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ABSTRACT
A majority of fishermen in the coastal areas of Bumi Seribu Nyiur Melambai, East 
Kalimantan, Indonesia, are migrants from other islands of Indonesia. This paper presents results 
from a research of the fisherman community. Most of the fisherman came from lower-middle-class 
families. Both lower-and lower-middle-class fisherman have access to the development program, 
aids and others resources delivered by government and international corporate. This paper describes 
how most fisherman see and believe that Bumi Seribu Nyiur Melambai is an area of battle for 
many actors to upscale their economic and social mobility through accumulation of wealth and 
social status. Many fishermen express the ambiguity, uncertainty, and marginality of their social-
economic status. The marginal status is caused by (i) Long Story of Unequal Social Structure; (ii) 
elite capture of programs and aids (iii) uncertainty and the loss of fishing area due to the presence of 
the company; (iv) Their technology are not able to resist the change of seasons. Data in this research 
are collected by qualitative and quantitative method, such as a participatory observation, in-depth 
interview, FGD, and survey.
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INTRODUCTION
This article suggests that the operation of 
oil companies has limited physical, social and 
economic space of the fishermen. Considered as 
vulnerable group, fishermen community has been 
the target of development interventions initiated by 
the government and the companies. Nevertheless, 
many actors have competed for access to the 
development programs and aid to upscale their 
social and economic status. In the power relation 
contexs, local elites play an instrumental role in 
shaping struggles for power over processes and 
outcomes of participatory interventions in the 
fishery community in East Kalimantan, which is 
characterized by social hierarchy. This study is 
conducted among fisher community in Samboja 
in the vastly industrialized area of Delta 
Mahakam. Samboja has been notorious of 
its fish production in East Kalimantan since 
1970s. Around 20.000 to 30.000 tons of fish 
were captured in the area in 1970s (Sarwono, 
1989). According to Suyatna, et.al, (2010), the 
province had the potential to develop its fish 
production due to the variety of fish species in its 
coastal areas.  . The number of fish production 
in the province varies from year to year. In 
2015 the province produced 154.439 tons 
of fish, of which 106.903 tons were marine 
captured production and the rest of 47.536 
tons were aquaculture production. Including in 
the aquaculture production are pond, brackish 
water (tambak) and bamboo cage (keramba) 
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cul ture  f ishery.  In  2015,  brackish water 
culture fishery produced 28.611 tons, which 
comprised of 7.713,8 tons of giant tiger prawns, 
6.076,3 tons of milkfish and 4.821 tons of crab. 
In addition, pond culture fisheries produced 3.563 
tons, which comprised of 970, 7 tons of nile tilapia, 
221,9 tons of pangasius, 1.180,9 tons of common 
carp and 1.189,9 tons of catfish. The production of 
bamboo cage (keramba) aquaculture fishery was 
33.414 tons, which comprised of 8.073,9 tons of 
common carp, 8.949,3 tons of nile tilapia, 3.803,6 
tons of pangasius, 4.142,2 tons of snakehead 
murrel and 8.445,6 tons of giant snakehead. In 
the same year, East Kalimantan also produced 
88.445,2 tons of seaweed, soaring from the merely 
8.445,2 tons in 2014. The number of production 
was nevertheless lower than that in 2013, which 
reached 249.411,7 tons (Antara, April 2016).
The fishermen of Samboja are the Bugis, 
Banjarese, Butonese, Javanese and Sundanese 
migrants. As migrants, they have little awareness 
on locality. In addition, their social and economic 
status is uncertain and ambiguous. This study 
investigates why vertical social and economic 
mobility through wealth and social status 
accumulation do not happen among the fishermen. 
Why does their social and economic mobility 
remain ambiguous? This study reveal that the 
stagnant social mobility is caused by (i) unfair 
social structure; (ii) elite capture to aids and 
development program; (iii) narrowed catching 
area due to companies’ operational demand; (iv) 
technology that is not able to respond to change of 
season. The idea of developmentalism is prominent 
in Samboja. It aims to improve the area through 
massive industrialization, which changes not 
only physical space but also the pattern of social 
and economic structure in the area. As Pelusso 
(2008) mentioned, the spatial change at a local 
scale has made ones get a better sense of both 
process and unintended consequences. Moreover, 
the developmental approach puts an emphasis 
on the role of elites, state capture and broader 
transformation of the society (Maniokas, K. 2014).
To revise the developmental approach, the 
government implements community driven 
development projects that aim to increase 
community’s control over the development 
process. Unfortunately, participatory approach is 
also vulnerable of being dominated by the elites. 
The process by which the elites dominate and 
corrupt community-level planning and governance 
is called elite capture (Dasgupta dan Beard, 
2007). Theoretically formulated, where there is 
“serious power imbalances…. The poor are heavily 
dependent on vertical links with local elites. 
(Therefore) it is difficult to form the horizontal 
associations necessary for organizing collective 
action for the common good” (Das Gupta, et.al., 
2004: 28). When collective action is co-opted by 
the interests of elites, it is likely that the elites will 
take benefit from it (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 
2000). Moreover, when the sociocultural context 
of social relation is permeated by the values of 
harmony, conflict diminishing and the lack of 
check and balance, elite capture is likely to happen. 
This study focuses on fishermen community 
in two kelurahan in Samboja, namely Sanipah 
and Handil Baru. Data were collected through 
survey, observation, in-depth interview and 
Focus Group Discussion (FGD). The survey was 
conducted in 16 April to 13 May 2015, involving 
250 family respondents who were picked by 
listing fisherman families in the villages. As the 
main focus is fisherman family, 90% of the data 
are about fishermen family. The total number of 
respondents is 1.145 people from 108 families 
in Sanipah (282 men and 242 women) and 142 
families in Handil Baru (310 men and 311 women). 
The fishermen respondents can be categorized 
as (i) those working in marine capture fishery, 
namely fishermen using gill net, purse seine, troll, 
long line and bamboo fish trap (ii) those working 
in aquaculture fishery, such as pond and brackish 
water fishermen as well as seaweed farmers and 
(iii) those working in fishery products processing 
such as fish drying and salting. 
In doing observation, the researchers identified 
and documented fishermen’s activities and how 
the community communicated with stakeholders. 
There were several observation areas, among 
which were fishermen settlements around the river 
delta (Handil Baru and Sanipah delta) and near pipe 
route (Sei Tanggi and Sei Mantri), a kiosk where 
people and youngsters often gathered, community 
activities such as collective prayer, government 
offices, Sigagu market area, weekly market both 
in Sanipah and Handil Baru, brackish water culture 
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area that raised fish and farmed seaweed as well 
as places where fishermen placed their purse seine 
with a bamboo hut above it (belat).
Among key informants in the fishermen 
community were the chief and members of 
fishermen association, fish wholesaler and retailers 
as well as Punggawa (the capital owner in the 
patron-client structure of fishermen community). 
Asides from them, the informants included 
community figures, government officers, youth 
figures, community organization officers and other 
community members. Focused Group Discussion 
(FGD) was conducted 20 times in two villages, 
covering various themes and involving fishermen, 
fishermen association’s officers, fisherwomen, 
village government officers, stakeholders in sub-
district level, community figures, youth figures 
and community association (RT) officers. The 
study employed triangulation analysis to reach 
conclusion and analyzed stakeholder network 
using statistic program. 
Stakeholder mapping helps researchers to 
identify issues deliberated among key actors in 
the community, the actors’ interest, the strength of 
each actor in influencing decision making process, 
their different perceptions to the existing issues, 
interaction among actors and actors’ resources 
(both capital and social resources). The stakeholder 
mapping is conducted through the following steps. 
First, identifying the community’s key actors 
through in-depth questions and focused group 
discussion (FGD). Second, preparing tables and 
graphic that illustrate information on actors’ name, 
their alliance and network, issues in which they are 
involved, their interest, their capital and political 
support as well as their behavior. Stakeholders 
mapping approach that is based on stakeholders 
classes (Mitchell, et.al., 1997), facilitates the 
identification of power, legitimacy and urgency 
under the interest of the elites. 
DISCUSSION
Long story of unequal social structure
“Our plate of rice is in the ocean”, H. Said, a 
Sanipah fisherman.
This study was conducted in Samboja Sub-
district, Kutai Kartanegara District. With the size 
of 1 045,90 km2, Samboja is situated in 116º 50’ E 
- 117º 14’E and 0º52’ S– 1º08’ S in the hemisphere. 
The capital of the sub-district is Samboja Kuala, 
located 20 meters above the sea. Samboja is now 
divided into 21 villages and kelurahan (urban 
community) and 239 sub-village associations (RT). 
With 4,45% population growth per year, in 2010 
Samboja’s population numbered 58 171. The rate 
of population density was 56 people/km2 in 2012 
(BPS, 2013). 
The beauty of Sanipah and Handil Baru coast, 
which was notorious for “a thousand swaying 
coconut trees” and its abundant sea products (so 
abundant that people said, “fish and shrimps were 
many like the heaviness of rain”), is still clear in 
people’s memory. Most of fishermen in Handil 
Baru and Sanipah came from Sulawesi. Migration 
began in 1960-1970 when fishermen enjoyed 
the most success that was marked by their Haji 
pilgrimage and several trips home to Sulawesi. The 
success story had attracted the fishermen’s relatives 
to work overseas (informans says). 
Fisherman does not only refer to a profession 
but also to a complex social relation. Fishermen 
largely depend on a capital owner, which is 
commonly called punggawa. Punggawa provides 
fishermen with loan to fund their fishing activities, 
gives them access to market by buying their catch 
and maintains social relations between them. 
Punggawa usually maintains the fishermen’s 
dependency on capital, while the fishermen express 
their gratitude to punggawa by selling their catch 
only to him. The punggawa-subordinate relation 
makes fishermen unable to set the price of their 
catch on their own. It is the punggawa who has been 
playing significant roles in the fishermen’s lives. 
Competition to have more subordinates occurs 
among punggawas. Some persuade fishermen 
by giving them loan, some seize fishermen that 
already become other punggawa’s subordinates 
to be theirs.  Punggawa has the power to set the 
catch price, usually lower than the price set by 
wholesaler, retailers and buyers. Moreover, the role 
of punggawa can be inherited by their relatives. 
Qualitative data revealed that before 1990, 
many residents of Handil Baru and Sanipah had 
already worked as fishermen other than the Bugis. 
In 1982, when “the fire ate the soil”, referring to 
long drought and fire in coconut plantation, many 
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Banjarese left their job in the plantation and went 
to sea to catch fish. As most of them only haved 
their manpower instead of money, boat and other 
fishing tools, they heavily depended on punggawa. 
Now, fishermen has less space both in social-
economic and physical sense after the establishment 
of oil, gas and coal companies. Responding to 
this situation, some fishermen decide to stay in 
their former place, some move to other place 
(menandang) and some change profession to work 
in the land (mendarat). The number of people 
working as fishermen does decrease. It is common 
that in one family, there are more than one people 
working as fishermen. 
Moreover, fishermen also experience other 
pressure. The issuance of Ministry Decree No.2 
Year 2015 has been preventing fishermen to use 
trawls, bottom trawls, midwater trawls, seine nets 
and boat seine net due to ecological reasons (news.
kutaikartanegarakab.go.id, 2016). Instead of going 
to the sea, some fishermen attempt to work in 
brackish water fishery business, which provides 
more opportunity of diversification. Brackish 
water culture does not only cultivate shrimps and 
fish, but also seaweed (www.antaranews.com, 23 
April 2015). Fishermen, however, remain in the 
difficult position. Their complaint on the catch 
decrease to the government is not sufficiently 
responded. Fishermen believe that many policies 
are issued not for their best interest but for the 
oil and gas companies’. The establishment of 
pipes for gas has made the catching area narrower 
because fishermen are not allowed to fish in the 
area less than 3 miles from the pipes. As there are 
several gas and oil wells in Delta Mahakam, the 
fishing area is limited. Abrasion also happened 
massively in several places of Samboja coast due 
to reclamation (www.1news.id/2015).
Actually catch decrease happens in the east 
coast of Kalimantan. Yusuf, a fisherman living in 
Lango, said that he and his three colleagues went 
fishing with a small boat and only caught one small 
bucket of fish. “We only caught this much while 
we had already spent 15 liters of kerosene,” Yusuf 
said, referring to the insignificant result compared 
to the expense (www.mongabay.co.id/2013/04/24). 
Considering the vast growing industry in the area, 
it is likely that marine environment degradation 
has happened, which may affect the number of 
fish catch. 
Samboja fishermen also have inadequate 
access to kerosene. As there is a rule that prohibits 
ones buying kerosene using container in gas 
station, fishermen buy kerosene in the sea illegally. 
They have demanded the government to allow gas 
station selling kerosene in containers and to build 
a gas station near the port for the fishermen. The 
attempt, however, has failed.
The fishermen adapt to environmental change 
by changing their fishing tools and doing circular 
migration. A fisherman may change their fishing 
area and set purse seine under a bamboo hut 
called belat, which is commonly constructed 
by the fishermen in Gresik, East Java. Sanipah 
community expects the government to dredge 
the river delta that has become shallow. This is to 
prevent sea water flowing to the river and to enable 
the fishermen fishing while the tide is low (www.
mongabay.co.id/2013/04/24).
Among the surveyed households in Sanipah, 
46,3% of them are fishermen that use belat as 
fishing tools, while 29,9% use gill net (renge). As 
many as 1,5% surveyed households are fishermen 
using long net (merawai) and 4,4% using fish trap 
(rakang), 17,9% troll. In Handil Baru, 86,7% of the 
surveyed households are fishermen using gill-net 
(renge), 4,2% using fish trap (rakang) and 1,7% 
troll. Thus, most of the fishermen are those using 
belat and renge as fishing tools (PSKK Survey, 
2015).
The change of land usage in Handil Baru 
and Sanipah reflects the economic change in the 
area. In the past, the coast line of Sanipah was the 
settlement of fishermen until Total, an international 
oil and gas company, operated in the area. Many 
shops, hotels, restaurant, houses for rent and other 
service business place are now built in the coastal 
area, leaving only a small spot near Handil Baru 
as fishermen settlement. This situation is different 
from Handil Baru, where Chevron Oil and Gas 
Company operate. The operation area of Chevron 
is not as extensive as Total.  Figure 2 provides an 
overview of spatial change since the operation of 
oil and gas companies in the area.
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Uncertainty and the Loss of Fishing Area 
due to the Presence of Oil company
In the past, Sanipah was known as the area of 
bagan (net trap with bamboo hut above it) fishing. 
Sanipah coast has now become the operational area 
of Total, since 1970, much earlier than Chevron 
that has operated in Handil Baru since 2004. 
Total built their own port in Sanipah. Land usage 
map shows that the size of coastal or mangrove 
area in Handil baru is much larger than Sanipah. 
There are two ports built for fishermen in Handil 
Baru, namely Sei Raden and Handil Muara, while 
there is only one fishermen port left in Sanipah, 
namely Sanipah Muara. The size of coastal area 
that is accessible to fishermen affects the number 
of fishermen in the area. The number of fishermen 
in Sanipah is less than half of that of Handil Baru. 
Based on the survey conducted by PSKK UGM in 
2015, the number of fishermen in Sanipah was 67, 
while in Handil Baru 120. 
Ecological change began in 1990. The catch 
has since decreased both in quality and quantity. 
The oil companies built their infrastructure such 
as harbor by dredging the coast and installing pipes 
both in the water and land. The impacts of the 
infrastructure building are water pollution, cloudy 
water, belat and net destruction, narrowing fishing 
area, the increase of fishing cost and uncertainty 
of catch. The dredging of the company’s port in 
Sanipah once every year has transported mud to 
the fishing area, which tear fishermen’s net and 
reduce catch. The mud effect may happen for 
months because the mud spread to the sea and 
coast as well. 
Oil installation built in the water also changes 
the fishermen’s fishing route and area. Fishermen 
move further to the sea, making them spending more 
money for fuel while their catch decreases. Some 
of the fishermen shifted to brackish water culture 
but lasted only until 2000. The establishment of 
brackish water pond had, however, deteriorated 
mangrove forest.
Following the reduction of physical and 
economic space, and thus reduction of fishermen’s 
access to resources, there is a high demand for 
the government and oil companies to address the 
issue. The government has introduced several 
development programs such as trainings (fiber 
boat making, fishing equipment usage, net 
making, sea product processing), environmental 
improvement (ulin wood installation in the coast 
to prevent abrasion, port establishment, irrigation 
revitalization, canal and river management in the 
coastal area) and distributing aid (fishing tools 
such as gill net and cool boxes, saving and loan 
fund, port establishment, fishing boat donation). 
Three oil companies, namely Total, Chevron and 
ENI (a company that will operate in Handil Baru 
in the near future), have initiated a CSR programs 
that aimed to distribute fishing tools (trammel net 
and gill net (rengge)), give compensation before 
dredging the coast and distribute mangrove buds.
Figure 1
Spatial change due to the operation of oil company
Source: PSKK UGM Survey 2015
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Technologies not Being Able to Resist the 
Change of Seasons
In June to October the sea is rough, the tide 
is high and the wind blows heavily. It is the south 
season, where most fishermen will not be able 
to fish. They call such a time as scarcity period 
(paceklik). In the past, those months were even 
called widow months because many fishermen 
died in the sea during the period, making their wife 
widow. The fishermen whose fishing tools are use 
fish trap (rakan), gill-net (renge), and purse seine 
cannot go fishing. To survive, they work clearing 
field harvesting and peeling coconuts, digging 
ditches and becoming construction worker. 
Most of the fishermen temporarily move to 
other place that is not affected by the wind and 
tide of south season to fish. This practice is called 
menandang in local language. The fishermen of 
Sanipah and Handil Baru, particularly those who 
have boat, move to Muara Badak and stay for 
several days there to fish. Before menandang, they 
go to the shops to take food and fuel supplies and 
pay them later after returning from Muara Badak. 
When the fishermen move to Muara Badak, 
they are likely to be bonded with new punggawa. 
Some punggawa from Handil Baru even follow 
their fishermen to Muara Badak. They provide 
fishermen with house to stay and food. Every 
punggawa in Muara Badak usually has 10-20 
fishermen subordinates. In addition to south 
season, the fishermen also recognize north season 
(November to May), where the sea is calmer and 
safer to fish. The north season is also called fish 
months. 
Fishermen’s Dynamics in Government and 
CSR Program
The first fishermen associations in Handil 
Baru, Harapan Baru and Harapan Jaya, was 
established in 2007. The government and oil 
companies require fishermen to register their 
association to Fisheries and Marine Office (DKP) 
and kelurahan government in order to access 
aid and empowerment program. The number of 
fishermen association increases and they receive 
more aid through empowerment programs initiated 
by the government and oil companies through their 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) program. 
The growing number of fishermen association has 
actually weakened the power of punggawa as DKP 
and oil companies only recognize the associations. 
Many fishermen, who were tied to punggawa in 
the past, now become the members of association. 
Despite of its eased access to government aid 
and CSR program, fishermen associations create 
insignificant impact to their fishermen members’ 
welfare. The chief of fishermen association acts 
like punggawa and even two punggawas become 
the chief of fisherman associations. Although the 
chief does not play role in setting the fish price, he 
does have the power to determine who can become 
the member of the association and who cannot. 
Some associations are even comprised of family 
members and relatives, which makes associations 
a place for certain family to accumulate access. 
The chief also hasve access to information on 
empowerment program and aid distributed by 
the government and companies. There are many 
fishermen who cannot join the association because 
of various reasons, among which are that they are 
not the family of the chief,  they belong to different 
community association (RT), they do not trust the 
chief and they have to pay contribution that is too 
costly for them. 
The Ministry of Marine and Fisheries helped 
4 fisherman associations in Handil Baru and 2 
associations in Sanipah to manage saving and 
loan program in 2014. Each association received 
100 million rupiah. Most of the loan was unpaid 
and the reporting was poor. In addition, many 
fishermen perceived that the money was not a 
loan but a grant. The program thus did not solve 
fishermen’s financial problem. In Focus Group 
Discussion (FGD) that involved 15 fishermen in 
Handil Baru and held on 15 May 2015, it was 
revealed that fishermen now preferred to borrow 
from fishing equipment or food supply shop. 
Fishermen, thus, cannot release themselves from 
debt. Moreover, the empowerment programs 
for fishermen only provides short-term benefit. 
Aided fishing equipments such as gill-nets do 
not last long and neither does a modern boat in 
Handil Muara, which is now broken and unused. 
In addition, fishing and sailing technology used 
by fishermen are inadequate in responding to 
ecological and seasonal change. As mentioned 
previously, fishermen use traditional fishing 
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equipments such as gill net, belat, fish-traps 
and long lines. The compensations given to 
fisherman by oil companies have less significant 
effect to alleviate the impacts of the company’s 
operation. Fishermen become the target group 
of several empowerment programs initiated by 
the government and oil companies. The problem 
following the empowerment program is elite’s 
competition to get access to the program. 
Aside from demanding the implementation 
of empowerment program to aid them (which, 
unfortunately, brings less significant impacts to 
their welfare), fishermen also demand the company 
to provide jobs for their children. The number of 
fishermen in the area is likely to decrease in the 
future because the old ones will retire while the 
young ones are reluctant to take their place. Most 
of the youngsters prefer to work in the company 
than fishing for the following reasons (1) working 
in the company is considered to provide more 
security than fishing or farming because of the 
monthly pay, (2) company’s work is considered 
less tough than fishing as workers get two days off 
in a week, (3) a young man working in the company 
has more prestige than one who works in the sea or 
farm, (4) it is believed that parents now preferred a 
son in law who works in the company, (5) parents, 
particularly fishermen, do not want their children 
to have similar profession with theirs because they 
want the next generation to have better life.
Working in the oil company is seen as a 
solution to decreased welfare due to catch decrease. 
Unfortunately, the companies have limited vacant 
posts and they require certain level of education 
and skill, of which most fishermen children cannot 
meet. Worker recruitment by oil companies always 
becomes a heated issue due to tough competition. 
Elite Capture of Programs and Assistance
Kusumawati (2016) addresses the question 
on how to capture the elites for empowerment 
project implementation. Elite capture is an attitude 
or action of a group of people to influence policy 
and decision making process for the fulfillment 
of their interest either in material or non-material 
form. Since the introduction of participatory 
approach in development that “putting the last 
first”(Chambers, 1983), the model of learning 
with the poor has resulted on new domination 
model in the community, namely the emergence 
of learning elites (Wilson, 2006). Acting as 
development brokers, the elites place themselves 
as the community’s representation and connect the 
target community with external parties, (Platteau 
dan Gaspart, 2003: 3). In Kenya, cases show that 
elite capture seriously undermines the outcome of 
development projects (Rigon, A., 2014). Platteau, 
J.-P.a , Somville, V.b , Wahhaj, Z.c (2014) mentions 
that elite capture happens because of information 
distortion, which occurs in the situation where (i) 
communities are heterogeneous and dominated by 
the local elite, (ii) the elite strategically proposes 
a project to the donor, knowing that the latter has 
imperfect knowledge of the needs of the target 
population.
This specific study considers the existence of 
power networks of local elites as a fundamental 
importance of social fact and the starting point for 
the study of patronage in the governance of the 
coastal area of East Kalimantan. It also analyzes 
the multiple-scale networks of local power holders 
(punggawa), the collaboration and friction between 
the political-economic interests and historical 
values of local actors and the scientific motivations 
of international environmental organizations. This 
study describes how collaboration and friction 
between members of the elite challenge models 
that categorically exclude or co-opt local elites 
in foreign projects. In-depth ethnographic study 
of these networks shows their resilience through 
flows of knowledge and power in a highly volatile 
coastal environment. Results indicate the need for 
inclusion in decision making of local entrepreneurs, 
and - indirectly - their dependents in decentralized 
coastal governance.
Warren C. (2016), through a set of Indonesian 
case studies that examine practices of local leaders 
and elites, overviews theoretical controversies 
on leadership, patronage and elite capture that 
challenges the assumptions across a wide range 
of current policy literature. The studies also seek 
to account in structural terms for appropriation 
both by “elite capture” and of “captured elites” 
as well as to explore the structural factors and 
co-governance practices most likely to promote 
effective participation of the full spectrum of local 
interests in pursuit of better local natural resource 
governance. 
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Lucas, A. (2016) examines leadership, 
elite capture and corruption in two villages in 
Sumatra. His paper compares implementation and 
outcomes of several conservation and development 
projects in the context of democratization and 
decentralization reforms introduced in Indonesia 
since 1998. Focusing on the activities of local 
elites, particularly village officials, who use their 
positions to monopolize planning and management 
of projects that were explicitly intended to 
incorporate participatory and accountability 
features, the study finds that while elites’ use of 
authority and influence to benefit personally from 
their roles clearly reflects elite capture, there are 
nonetheless members of elite groups in these 
case studies who use their control of projects to 
broad community benefit. In both villages there 
is considerable friction between villagers and 
elites as well as among members of the local 
elite themselves over control of local resources. 
Differences in the structure of these cross-cutting 
internal relationships and of ties between local 
authorities and outside government and non-
government agents largely explain the differences 
in degree of elite capture and its outcomes in the 
two cases.
In 2014, The Department of Marine and 
Fisheries of Kutai Kartanegara District held 
trainings for fishermen to improve the fishermen’s 
knowledge and skills in fisheries, particularly 
aquaculture related fisheries. The next training 
program, fish farming technique, targeted 100 
hundred fishermen in 18 sub-districts. Other 
programs include boat repairing program, 
which targets 1000 fishermen in 18 sub-districts 
(Rakhmad and Ali, 2015:18).
With the presence of oil companies in their 
area, fishermen community has to deal with other 
entities in the coastal areas. Contestation happens 
in various level within and among (1) fishermen 
associations, communities, non-government 
organizations, political party’s success team; (2) 
companies, particularly smaller companies that 
bid for government and bigger company’s projects; 
(3) local government bodies (Village Association 
(RT), Community Empowerment Body (LPM), 
Village Governance Body (LPD), kelurahan 
government and sub-district government). Both 
formal and informal organizations play multiple 
roles and set multiple goals as well, namely 
struggle for the organization’s interests, access to 
government and company’s projects and the role of 
man power supplier. Such strategic positions with 
multiple roles are usually competed for.
The issue of locals vs migrants often emerges 
during company worker recruitment. Community 
organizations and non-government organizations 
demand the company to prioritize the recruitment 
for the locals. In fact, access to employment is 
often controlled by a group of family members 
and relatives. Some of the local residents have to 
spare some of their salary as compensation to their 
group or non-government organizations for helping 
them getting a job in the company. The role of man 
power supplier played by the elites has become a 
boomerang for the locals because it limits their 
own space. 
Local groups and organizations such as 
Kalimantan Native Youth Movement (GEPAK), 
State Defend Command (Kobra), East Kalimantan 
Customary Youth Movement (LPADKT), 
Dayak Customary Heritage Guarding Command 
(KOPPAD), Pemuda Pancasila (PP) and river 
(Sei) based youth organizations also participate in 
the contestation with their own interests. In 2008, 
Chevron initiated Local Business Development 
(LBD) program for the community around the 
company in Handil Baru and Sanipah. Since 2010, 
small companies have emerged in the area. 
In some cases where competition to gain 
access to oil company’s projects happens, the issue 
of local identity emerges or being deliberately used 
in certain situations. In the area that is closer to the 
location where the company operates, contestation 
among elites escalates. The categorization of area 
around the company from most to least impacted 
based on ring pattern, has affected the scale of 
empowerment program, aid and man power 
demand in different areas. Fishermen are also 
involved in this contestation among local elites and 
even within their own group, which is controlled 
by the chief of association. 
The emergence of new elites (both in group 
and individually) that only work for their own 
interest as well as of non-government organizations, 
youth organizations and customary law based 
organizations is the excess of economic dynamics 
that depends heavily to the government and oil 
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companies. The competition to gain access to 
government and oil company projects reflects the 
phenomenon of elite capture. 
This study finds that local elites do not 
represent the interests of all community members. 
Local organizations formed by the community 
and oil companies that are originally aimed to 
strengthen the community’s economic potentials 
have otherwise reflected resource distribution 
pattern among the elites. Power is thus polarized 
and different groups compete for the fulfillment of 
their interests. In one kelurahan, the power holders 
are polarized into the most powerful (the elites) 
and the less powerful (non-elites). In addition, no 
community figures can be counted on to mediate or 
settle the conflict. Extreme polarization has created 
wider gap and provided less space for integration. 
Figure 2
Stakeholder map in Handil Baru and Sanipah
Source: PSKK UGM, Survey 2015
Based on their interests to the companies, the 
elites can be categorized as those who have high 
interests (most of them are definitive stakeholders) 
and those who have no interests at all (most of 
them are latent stakeholders). The most powerful 
elites are commonly definitive stakeholders. They 
use the position to gain opportunity to control 
aid program, such as monopolizing water and 
sanitation program for their own family and 
relatives. Most of the elites with less power are 
latent stakeholders, who have not yet been able to 
use their potential due to their marginal position in 
power relation. 
Familial relationship is the basis of power 
in Handil Baru. Community members, including 
the youth, often criticize the situation of elites 
competition, but the criticism is conducted behind 
the elite’s back so that the latter do not recognize 
that. One of the youth, who is the member of Youth 
Organization (Karang Taruna) mentioned:
“We do not want to get involved in those 
bickering because they are our relatives. 
If we have debate with intelligent person, 
we will be intelligent as well, but debating 
with thug will make us thug, too. There 
are many aid but we do not know where it 
has gone…Every organization (including 
LPM) can propose a project to Kelurahan 
government with the budget less than 200 
million. Companies can give them too. Many 
organization officers used their organization 
jacket to have access to projects,” (interview 
statement, 27 April 2015).
Check and balance function does not work 
because some elites are relatives. Social harmony is 
maintained with the expense of critical attitude and 
apathy. In Sanipah, the power map is incongruent; 
the elites who have most interests to companies do 
not always take active roles. Thus, the elites who 
structurally have power in the community are not 
automatically definitive stakeholders. 
This study also finds that government and 
non-government organizations avoid opened 
conflict by distributing programs and projects 
among themselves. Actually, some government 
and company initiated projects that are aimed 
to be spaces for integration become arenas of 
competition. Community self-help programs do 
not exist anymore because most programs, such as 
water channel outlet building, canal management 
and community collective work, are now funded by 
the government or companies. Community groups 
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and actors compete for access to natural resources 
the most, but now empowerment programs and 
the status as man power supplier are also valuable 
resources to be competed for. The vulnerable 
fisherman community is often caught in the middle 
of elite competition. 
The categorization of area around the company 
from most to least impacted one has set the coastal 
area as the most impacted one. The fishermen 
are thus the target of empowerment program and 
the coast has been the arena of elite contestation, 
which does not only involve the fisherman but 
also other parties. This shows that the community 
tend to take direct benefit from the company by 
optimizing their material resources and using their 
position (social capital). When the operation area 
of the company expands, elites capture follows and 
stakeholder map changes as it is possible that new 
elites emerge and old ones loose their power. 
Government and oil company initiated 
empowerment  p rograms  have  t r iggered 
fishermen to establish fisherman association, 
which ideally serves as new social network 
that replaces punggawa-subordinate relation. In 
fact, the association is merely an administration 
requirement to access the empowerment and 
aid program. Elite capture has made fishermen 
association weak and the empowerment programs 
have placed the fishermen as dependant to external 
help. The existing empowerment programs have 
not yet succeeded to promote the establishment of 
fishermen learning community that is self-reliant, 
participatory and supportive to environment 
restoration. 
CONCLUSION
The operation of oil companies has limited 
the physical, social and economic space of the 
fishermen in Handil Baru and Sanipah. The 
fishermen are powerless in their relation with 
punggawa, while fisherman association has been 
marginalized in the midst of elite capture of 
empowerment program. This study reveals that 
instead of competing for access to physical spaces 
and company’s operational benefit, the elites fight 
for the access to empowerment programs funded 
by oil and gas companies. Problems happen when 
the programs do not focus to community welfare 
and environmental sustainability. As a result, 
fishermen will gradually leave the coastal areas. 
The fact that the community members are 
migrants contributes to the weak socio-cultural 
bond to local issues that they tend to put their 
individual and group interests first. Competing 
for access to empowerment program, aid and the 
status as man power supplier, the elites take the 
strategy of defense mechanism by narrowing down 
and reducing the identity of social and community 
space based on different interests. This is the 
pattern of elite capture that is prominent in this 
case. 
Stakeholder map configuration is fluid and 
changes frequently due to elite’s contestation. 
Social relations are biased when company interests 
involve, which results on community and social 
space reduction. Ones can perceive it as horizontal 
conflict from the outside, while from the inside 
groups actually negotiate to distribute access to aid 
and empowerment programs among themselves. 
At certain period of time (the length of public 
officer’s office period or during election process) 
or when new programs are implemented, new 
actors may emerge and another may resign. There 
is no dominant elite in the center as the power is 
fragmented to many elites. 
In the implementation of development 
program, it is important to evaluate the performance 
of local elites. Community empowerment and CSR 
programs actually contribute to the elites’ wealth 
accumulation and support local elite’s status quo. 
The elites have broader network and influence than 
other community members, including fishermen. 
The empowerment programs have widened social 
gap in the coastal community and raised latent 
conflict that will explode once the empowerment 
or CSR programs diminish. 
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